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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
ERIC LEON BUTT, JR., ; 
Appellant. ] 
) Appeal No. 20090655 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT 
BUTT DISTRIBUTED HARMFUL MATERIAL. 
This Court has held, iC[g]enerally, the function of a reviewing court is limited to 
insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to 
enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App. 220, 1J13, 985 P.2d 919 (internal quotations 
omitted), citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah \99l)(quoting State v. Warden, 
813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991)). The Utah Supreme Court has held as follows 
concerning the elements of the offense and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard: 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless 
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The 
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, 
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
278, 113 S.Ct 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 
364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by 
those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes before 
we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure 
of evidence, but also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's 
conscience. The measure of certainty the law demands before finding guilt 
reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the 
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment 
of the innocent. 
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, Tfl 1, 116 P.3d 305. 
"Distribute'' is defined by UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(3) as, "to transfer 
possession of materials whether with or without consideration." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-4-
101 governs the charge of Attempting to Distribute Harmful Materials and states as 
follows: 
For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if he: (a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the crime; and (b) (i) intends to commit the crime; or (ii) 
when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an 
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result. (2) For 
purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly 
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
Ibid. In State v. Hopkins, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed what must be proven to 
convict someone of attempting to deal harmful material to a minor, stating as follows: 
To convict Hopkins of attempted dealing in material harmful to a minor, 
the State had to prove that knowing the person was a minor or "having 
negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor," he intentionally 
took a substantial step to "distribute[] ... to a minor any material harmful 
to minors:' [UTAH CODE ANN. §§] 76-10-1206(l)(a) [and] 76-4-101. 
Ibid, 2009 UT App 165, %L9 2009 WL 1709246 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated as follows: 
This Court has in numerous cases stated that in presenting defenses in 
2 
criminal cases a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion. It is 
sufficient for acquittal that the evidence or lack thereof creates a reasonable 
doubt as to any element of the crime. 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980), citing State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 
1977) (further citations omitted). 
"It is an offense to take a letter or other mail matter before delivery to the 
addressee^] with the intent to obstruct correspondence or to pry into the business of 
another." 72 C.J.S. Postal Service § 80. Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1702, it states as follows: 
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or 
any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, 
or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the 
custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the 
person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, 
or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, 
embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
It is axiomatic that citizens have the right to rely upon the laws of the land as they are 
written and as reasonably interpreted. 
"The common law mailbox rule has been in existence for well over a 
century...and was given full judicial imprimatur by the U.S. Supreme Court over 120 
years ago. . ." Rios v. Mansfield, 21 Vet.App. 481, 482 (Vet.App. 2007)(citations 
omitted). "The rule is well settled that if a letter properly directed is proved to have been 
either put into the post-office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed, from the known 
course of business in the post-office department, that it reached its destination at the 
An "addressee'' is defined as "one to whom something is addressed." See, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/addressee. The term "address" in the verb tense means to "communicate directly," "to 
speak or write directly to" and "to identify...by an address or a name for information transfer." See, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/addressed. 
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regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed"" Rosenthal v. 
Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193, 4 S.Ct. 382 (U.S. 1884)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
"[T]he presumption so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law, but a mere 
inference of fact, founded on the probability that the officers of the government will do 
their duty and the usual course of business. . ." Id., citing Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 
392. "[I]t is perfectly clear that [the presumption] applie[s] without regard to the contents 
of the letter." Id. at 194. "[T]he fact that receipt of the letter subjects the person sending 
it to a penalty does not alter the rule." Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 
419 (U.S. 1932), citing Rosenthal 111 U.S. at 194. 
In Sorrentino v. I.R.S. it states that, "[w]hen mail matter is properly addressed and 
deposited in the United States mails, with postage duly prepaid thereon, there is a 
rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the addressee in the ordinary course 
of mail." Ibid, 383 F.3d 1187, 1190 (C.A. 10 (Colo.) 2004)(emphasis added), citing 
Crude Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947). However, the common 
law presumption under this "mailbox rule" discussed supra only attaches when it is 
demonstrated that it was "properly directed" or "properly addressed." Collins v. Peake, 
2008 WL 4963351, *2 (Vet.App. 2008), citing Rios v. Nicholson, 490 F.3d 928, 933 
(Fed.Cir. 2007). It has been determined that the term "properly directed" as used in 
Rosenthal, supra, is not met when something as simple as an incorrect zip code is 
utilized. See, Busquets-Ivars v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 1008, 1010 (C.A.9 2003). It can be 
presumed that the term "properly addressed" in Sorrentino would result in the same for 
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lack of any portion of a correct address of the addressee, let alone if the item was directed 
at someone else entirely, as is the case in the instant matter. 
In its Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that the evidence provided to 
the jury proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Butt distributed harmful material to his 
daughter. Brief of Appellee at p. 15. The State erroneously argues that the letter, which 
was both "properly directed" and "properly addressed" to his wife, was actually to both 
her and their daughter since the child's initials appear on the cover of the envelope in a 
decor, but are clearly outside the addressee portion. 
The United States Postal Service regulations do not support the State's 
interpretation of the addressing of the mail at issue herein. The following example taken 
from their website, at www.usps.com/send/preparemailandpackages/ 
labelsandaddressing/usingthecorrectaddress.htm shows how to "properly address" or 
"properly direct" an item of mail: 
• Addressing ymir Mail 
- P o s t a g e 
Ussj 4 sUars;. Dtsiaqe -v*te> as PC F ^ a g * 
K> *8lx »s6 twfact a;r:-ju> tt. Us« our £•:**>» 
CasaHaic* Si cataji»tt> postage- nates'. 
• t teiwery Address 
PTWU cjsarty « K aafwery adores* 
isaraSe; '<o fcae kingest ««3e o« Use 
P^oUHjjj. Do r*si i«« c«oir:»i of 
Return Address 
Prist «• tyjve your ar»«<ss if-
upp*r Sett oorrsar or. tha i t w 
Ctty. S ta t e . sma ZiP Code 
~b fnvi tha carra-t s p r i n g or a 2;p Cede. 
use our onsoe Zip Coaafocau* -. 
• Addressing your Package 
Fteiurn Address in.mn 
Hf?!t or typ* ya'jr aocr~*^> )»-. P*' 
uppi.r tefi «Ofi«f no t?« ifon< of 
Delwsry Address 
Prsr" c<e&U tKt- d4 ' lw„ 
eKJOfless p*ttB«t h'; she k*\>>' 
sK» st HM package C-s re-
us? cof' ioai or pwsds 
Postage 
Us* a stamp, postosje m*J«* or 
PC Posiass io aiSx t t e coftsct 
City. Stat*, a n a Ztf» Cods 
To fend m* cancel ssssjiog w a Zip 
Code use our CTHXVS Zip U<x» 
<as*lorV 
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Clearly, the State's interpretation that the initials of the Children appearing in a decor on 
the outside of the envelope would be outside the perimeters of what would be considered 
"properly addressed" or "properly directed" to them. 
Butt mailed a letter addressed to his wife by placing it in the mail box provided for 
inmates at the San Juan County Jail. When Butt's letters were discovered by jail 
officials, they were confiscated. Butt testified he did send the Letters and addressed them 
to his wife. The originals appear in the record on this matter. Butt testified he knew his 
wife would see the pictures and, since she reads everything to the kids, he figured she 
would get a laugh out of it, stating, "[i]t's a pretty pathetic drawing." Butt indicated he 
intended for his children to see the pictures. Tr. at p. 113. However, Butt did not commit 
any substantial step to "distribute" the material to a minor, as that term's ordinary and 
accepted meaning implies. 
Butt was allowed to reasonably rely on 18 U.S.C.A. §1702 in addressing the 
envelope to his wife, with expectations that she would be the one to open it. He properly 
addressed it to her, with the addressee portion of the envelope containing her name and 
address. His intentions that she be the one to open the letter and review the contents 
inside is supported by the language contained in his letter alerting her to the explanation 
behind the rudimentary drawing at issue herein. 
He did not transfer the drawing directly to his daughter. UTAH CODE ANN.§76-10-
1201. He transferred the letters to his wife, and even alerted her to the contents for 
screening before giving the pictures at issue to his daughter. Contrary to the State's 
argument, the envelope contained in the record on appeal evidences it was addressed to 
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his wife, not his children. Under Sorrentino this would ensure that such mail would be 
delivered directly to her and not the children. 
Butt specifically mentioned the drawing to his wife in the Letters asking her 
whether it was appropriate to provide it to the daughter. He knew that she would not 
show the drawing to his daughter if she felt it was inappropriate, she was in the best 
position to make that call. To convict him of distributing harmful material to a minor, the 
State must prove the he intentionally took a substantial step towards distributing the 
material to his daughter. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1). The State has not proven 
this beyond a reasonable doubt as Butt took no step toward distributing the Letters. He 
simply granted his daughter's request and left it up to the mother as to whether his 
daughter would even be allowed to see the drawings. See, State's Exhibit #2, the First 
Letter. He did nothing to intentionally transfer the Letters to his daughter. To 
intentionally transfer the letters to his daughter, Butt would have needed to address the 
letters directly to her, thereby circumventing her mother's review of such letters. This did 
not occur. He sent the letters to his wife and allowed her to determine whether the 
children could see the drawings. 
Butt relinquished his possession of the Letters to another adult to whom the 
Letters were addressed. This is not a crime. He did not mail the Letters directly to his 
daughter, nor did he ensure she would have possession of the contents. Butt anticipated 
that his wife would preview the contents first and, if she did not feel the contents were 
appropriate, would not show his daughter the drawings. The Letters were directed and 
transferred to his adult wife. Accordingly, Butt's distribution of the material to another 
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adult does not meet the elements for dealing harmful material to a minor as set forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206. The material was distributed to another adult, causing no 
violation of the law. Thus, because it has not been shown that Butt intentionally 
distributed the drawings to his daughter, instead he intentionally distributed to his wife, 
which is not a crime the evidence is insufficient to meet the elements on dealing harmful 
material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IL THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
CONCLUSION THAT BUTT'S LETTERS WERE HARMFUL TO A 
MINOR. 
In its Brief of Appellee the State argues that there was sufficient evidence for the 
jury to establish that Butt's letters were harmful to his daughter beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Brief of Appellee at p. 18. The State is mistaken in this argument. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1206(1) states as follows: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing 
or believing that a person is a minor, or having negligently failed to 
determine the proper age of a minor, the person intentionally: (a) distributes 
or offers to distribute, or exhibits or offers to exhibit, to a minor or a person 
the actor believes to be a minor, any material harmful to minors;...[.] 
In the instant case, Butt argues the evidence was insufficient on the elements of 
the harmful material statute to convict him of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. See, 
Torres at 695. The State failed to produce sufficient evidence on the elements that Butt 
distributed harmful material to a minor beyond a reasonable doubt. See, Reyes at f^l 1. To 
allow the Verdict in this matter to stand allows for a lesser degree of certainty of guilt 
than the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt suggests, infringing upon Butt's Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. The State has inappropriately wielded its power in this 
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matter. The measure of certainty in this case reflects an imbalance of the prevention of 
conviction and punishment of the innocent. See, id. Accordingly, as the evidence was 
insufficient to support the Verdict on several elements beyond a reasonable doubt, this 
Court must vacate the Verdict. 
The State has presented no evidence that meet the elements set forth in UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(5). While the Letters may be construed as inappropriate by 
some standards, there was no evidence that they met the definition of "harmful material," 
as set forth in the Code. It must also be shown that what may be considered harmful to 
an adult or even a teenager may not be harmful to a very young child. The rudimentary 
drawings by Butt may have incited inappropriate thoughts in a teenager or even an adult 
because of their greater knowledge base. However, to a young and naive child who lacks 
such knowledge, the rudimentary drawings would have meant nothing more than 
hieroglyphs on a cave wall and would not have been harmful. Thus, Butt was unlawfully 
convicted on a standard below that of "beyond a reasonable doubt" and his conviction 
should thus be overturned. 
A. There was insufficient evidence to show that Butt's pictures 
appealed to the prurient interest in sex of minors. 
In it's Brief of Appellee the State claims that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that Butt violated UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201 (5)(a)(i), which requires that the 
material, 'taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors" to show that 
it is harmful. Brief of Appellee at p. 25. The State is incorrect in this argument. 
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The Utah Supreme Court indicated that "the definition of 'prurient interest' raises 
conceptual and definitional difficulties. . .[although contemporary community standards 
provide the legal point of reference for determining prurient interest, mere nudity or 
simple reference to or discussion of sex does not, as a matter of law, appeal to the 
prurient interest." City of St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah 1993). "A 
prurient interest in sex under the law is not the same as a candid, wholesome, or healthy 
interest in sex." Id., citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498, 105 
S.Ct. 2794, 2798-99, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985); State v. Bartanen, 121 Ariz. 454, 591 P.2d 
546 cert, denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). "[W]hen 
determining whether a work appeals to the prurient interest, it must be judged as a whole, 
and not on the basis of its isolated parts." Id., citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). 
In the instant matter, the rudimentary drawings at issue would not have appealed 
to the prurient interest of Butt's five (5) year old daughter. The rudimentary nature of the 
pictures at issue would be less likely to appeal to the prurient interest of a five year old 
child than taking that child to a museum with other types of artwork and statues depicting 
nudity. Appealing to the prurient interest would seem to require, at a minimum, the 
possibility of inciting a child exposed to such to ask questions about sex. The 
rudimentary pictures at issue herein do not depict a sexual act of any kind, and are 
nothing more than stick figures depicted by an amateur artist. 
Furthermore, in the Brief of Appellee the State relies upon the matter of Ginsberg 
v. New York 390 U.S. 629, 88 S. Ct.1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 to show that what may be 
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considered okay for adults may still be considered obscene for minors. Brief of Appellee 
at p. 21. However, the State is incorrect in its reliance upon this matter. Not only does 
Ginsberg rely upon a New York State statute that has since been changed and 
renumbered, it was also handed down five (5) years prior to the case of Miller v. 
California 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. While the State concedes that 
Ginsberg preceded Miller, it argues that the Supreme Court has never changed what it 
stated in Ginsberg with regards to the states being allowed to withhold material from 
minors even if such material would not be considered obscene to adults. Brief of 
Appellee at p. 21. Miller remains the precedent in this matter as the more recent decision 
of the two (2) cases. Thus, the State is incorrect in its reliance upon Ginsberg. 
Therefore, since a prurient interest in the rudimentary drawings depicted by an 
amateur artist would not be incited in a five year old due to naivety and lack of 
knowledge about such things, it is clear that the drawings created by Butt did not appeal 
to her prurient interest and thus, were not harmful. 
B. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ALLOW THE JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT BUTT'S DRAWINGS 
VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE COMMUNITY STANDARD. 
In its Brief of Appellee the State continues to argue that the drawings were 
sufficient for the jury to determine that they violated the contemporary community 
standards. Brief of Appellee at p. 28. The State continues to be incorrect in making this 
argument. 
"Contemporary community standards" is defined as "those current standards in the 
vicinage where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will 
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occur." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he 
wording the statute clearly establishes a local standard as opposed to a statewide 
standard" according the statute's plain language. State v. International Amusements, 565 
P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977). International Amusements continued as follows: 
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the 
average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for 
making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his 
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of the 
law. 
Id. at 1114, quoting Hambling v. U. S„ 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 
(1974). 
The United States Supreme Court has determined the following concerning 
community standards: 
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations 
on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but 
this does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform 
national standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 
'patently offensive.' These are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation 
is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that 
such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, 
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers of fact are 
asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient,' it would 
be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract 
formulation. The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate 
factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers of fact 
to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by limiting 
instructions on the law. To require a State to structure obscenity 
proceedings around evidence of a national 'community standard' would be 
an exercise in futility. 
Miller at 30. 
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In the instant case, the State failed to present any evidence to the prevailing 
standard in the adult community that would deem the Letters "patently offensive" except 
for jail officials own personal concern about them. The factors for determining whether 
material or performance is pornographic are identical to determining whether material is 
harmful to a minor. See, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1203(1) and UTAH CODE ANN. §76-
10-1201(5). Obscenity will not be prosecuted unless it is patently offensive "hard core" 
sexual conduct. Miller at 27. The nature of the drawings in the Letters at issue herein 
would not be considered patently offensive to the adult community. The Letters do not 
depict hard core pornography, or even a sexual act. The drawings are merely crude stick 
figures attempting to depict nudity, but do not depict any sexual acts, masturbation, or 
lewdness. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(14). They are no different than what a child 
may see in a museum with nude statues or hieroglyphs at Native American ruins. As 
those things are not considered to be patently offensive to the community standard, the 
rudimentary stick drawings cannot rise to such level. 
The Letters depict simple stick figures that were drawn based upon a documentary 
watched by a father and daughter and based upon a game played by a father and 
daughter. Parents in Utah are allowed to accompany minors into R-rated movies 
depicting images of actual sex and nudity without fear of prosecution. It is axiomatic that 
the Letters are completely harmless in comparison and depict only those things a child 
would see in a documentary about cave dwellings, museum, or ancient ruins. 
The contemporary community standards to be applied in this matter was that of 
the vicinage wherein the offenses alleged occurred. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1201(2). 
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The jurors in this matter were entitled to draw on his or her own knowledge of the views 
of the average person in their community for making this determination, just as he or she 
would be entitled to draw on his or her knowledge of the propensities of a reasonable 
person in other areas of the law. International Amusements at 1114. Miller determined a 
jury should rely on local standards of what the community would consider obscene. Id. at 
26. The community standards throughout the State of Utah have been recognized by the 
Legislature to be diverse; hence, the triers of fact were asked to decide whether the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would consider the Letters 
patently offensive. See, Miller at 30. The average person would most likely not find the 
drawings patently offensive but merely rudimentary drawings by an amateur artist. 
The drawings were created in this matter are not patently offensive to the 
community standards was insufficient evidence presented to establish this and thus, 
Butt's conviction should be overturned. 
III. FAILURE TO READ BUTT HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO 
QUESTIONS CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED HARMLESS UNDER 
THE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD. 
Finally, in the Brief of Appellee the State argues that the failure to give Miranda 
warnings was harmless to Butt. Brief of Appellee at p.37. For the State to prevail on this 
argument, this Court must determine that the failure to provide such warnings was not 
just harmless, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"It is well established that the admission of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda can be harmless error." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 
1986)(quotations and citation omitted). "An error arising from a violation of the federal 
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constitution is considered harmless when an appellate court is "able to declare a belief 
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotations and citationomitted). "In 
order to make this declaration, i t is necessary to review the facts of the case and the 
evidence adduced at trial' to determine the effect of the challenged evidence 'upon the 
other evidence adduced at trial and upon the conduct of the defense." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12 indicate that a defendant 
shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This Court 
has held, "...the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." State 
v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah App.,1993) citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Such safeguards "...come into play whenever 
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent." Id., citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 997 (Utah App.,1992) ("[a]s 
a matter of federal law, an individual's right to the protections afforded in Miranda are 
triggered the moment the individual is subject to custodial interrogation."). Mirquet 
further continues as follows: 
We concluded [in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990)] that 
Utah courts place "a great deal of emphasis on the form of the questioning" 
in assessing whether the defendant is in custody. Id. If questioning is 
"merely investigatory, courts have not found custody." Id. {citing State v. 
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah, 1986). However, the moment the questioning 
15 
becomes accusatory "custody is likely and Miranda warnings become 
necessary." Id. {citing Garner, 664 P.2d at 1170; Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391). 
The court identified the change from investigatory to accusatory 
questioning as happening when the "'police have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to 
believe that the defendant has committed it."' Id. 808 P.2d at 1106 (quoting 
Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171). 
State v. Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah App., 1992) (alteration to the original). 
This Court has held the custody factors as found in Mirquet are inadequate to 
determine whether an incarcerated suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes. See, State 
v. Swink, 2000 UT App. 262,1[10, 11 P.3d 299. Hence, Swink determined, "[f]or persons 
incarcerated at the time of interrogation, the custody question generally turns on the 
'added imposition' analysis outlined in Cervantes [v. Walker 589 F.2d 424, (9th Circuit 
1978)]." Id. citing Id. at 428; (further citations omitted.) Swink held as follows: 
In any Miranda analysis, whether the encounter occurs on the street, or 
within the walls of a correctional facility, we must consider whether the 
individual was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Since a prisoner in a 
correctional facility is obviously not free to leave the facility, we must look 
for "a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added 
imposition on his freedom of movement," or "some act which places 
further limitations on the prisoner." Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. The 
Cervantes court offered the following four relevant considerations to be 
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable prisoner: (1) the language used 
to summon the inmate, (2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation, 
(3) the extent to which the inmate is confronted with evidence of his guilt, 
and (4) the additional pressure exerted to detain the inmate. See id. 
Id. at T[l 1. In U.S. v. Conley the Fourth Circuit stated the following: 
A different approach to the custody determination is warranted in the 
paradigmatic custodial prison setting where, by definition, the entire 
population is under restraint of free movement. The Ninth Circuit has taken 
the position that "restriction" is a relative concept and that, in this context, 
it "necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which 
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results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement." Cervantes, 
589 F.2d at 428. Thus, the court looked to the circumstances of the 
interrogation to determine whether the inmate was subjected to more than 
the usual restraint on a prisoner's liberty to depart. 
Ibid., 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, a reconciliation of Miranda must be made in 
inmate cases. In U.S. v. Cadmus, it states as follows and sheds some further light on this 
issue: 
The court in Cervantes rejected a per se rule that any investigatory 
questioning inside a prison requires Miranda warnings. 589 F.2d at 427. In 
determining that the questioning involved had not occurred while the 
defendant was in custody, the court in Cervantes held that an "added 
imposition on [the inmate's] freedom of movement" is necessary to 
constitute "custody" within the principles of Miranda. Id. at 428. See also 
Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272 (adopting reasoning of Cervantes). 
Ibid, 614 F.Supp. 367, 370 (D.C.N.Y.,1985). Cadmus found "that prison interrogation, 
whether by an investigator concerning prior potentially criminal conduct, or by a prison 
guard regarding prison crime immediately after its discovery, is custodial within the 
meaning of Miranda." Id. at 371-372. In support of this determination, Cadmus 
continued: 
A rule that persons in prison are in custody and must be advised of their 
rights prior to questioning is fully consistent with the logic underlying 
Miranda and Mathis. Miranda established a prophylactic rule intended to 
ensure that suspects are not coerced into confessing. See Berkemer, 104 
S.Ct. at 3147; see also Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188. The 
rule was designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and 
susceptible of abuse. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624 
("inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely"); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 
S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). Prison is certainly a "police 
dominated" surrounding that is inherently coercive. See Berkemer, 104 
S.Ct. at 3150, 3150 n. 28. Miranda recognized the powerful psychological 
effect on a person confined, alone with his interrogator, which often 
17 
induces the individual to reach for aid. 384 U.S. at 448-55, 86 S.Ct. at 
1614-17. This powerful influence is certainly present when the individual is 
confined in prison. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 273-74, 100 S.Ct. at 2188. 
Furthermore, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in 
large part from the knowledge of the accused that he cannot escape his 
interrogator, and that the questioning can continue until the desired answer 
is obtained. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 86 S.Ct. at 1624; see also 
Murphy, 104 S.Ct. at 1145-46. In Murphy, the Court discussed the situation 
where "a suspect ... is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator." 104 S.Ct. at 1146. It would be hard to 
conceive of a situation where the accused was less able to escape his 
interrogator than in a prison setting. Compare Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-
50 (motorist stopped for traffic stop reasonably expects to be free to 
continue on his way in short order). Indeed, in this case, Cadmus had 
already spent seven days in detention. There was no way for him to know 
when he might at least be able to return to his home. 
Id. at 372. 
In the instant case, Freestone received a photocopy of a letter written by Butt from 
Black. Tr. at p. 51. Freestone testified he was concerned after looking at the letter so "I 
went to the outgoing mail and retrieved that letter for investigation." Id. Freestone 
testified he spoke with Butt concerning the letter on November 14, 2008, and advised him 
the letter was being confiscated. Tr. at p. 56. Freestone next spoke with Butt on 
November 17, 2008, in reference to the Second Letter. Id. Freestone testified he became 
aware of the Second Letter in the same manner as the First Letter. Tr. at p. 62. Freestone 
testified he indicated to Butt the Second Letter had been confiscated. Tr. at p. 64. 
Johnson testified she had a conversation with Butt about the ages of his children. 
Tr. at p. 85. Johnson testified the conversation took place in November of 2008. Johnson 
testified she asked Butt about the ages of his children because Freestone had asked her to 
do so. Johnson testified Freestone did not tell her why to ask about Butt's children's ages 
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until after she asked him. Tr. at p. 87. Johnson testified that, later on, she became aware 
of letters Butt had written. Tr. at p. 88. Johnson testified she did not read Butt his 
Miranda rights before questioning him. Tr. at p. 89. Johnson testified she asked Butt what 
the names and ages of his children were, which he indicated were Sage, his daughter, five 
(5) years old, and Kade, his son, eight (8) years old. Id. Johnson testified she either 
placed her note indicating Butt's children's ages in Freestone's box or handed it directly 
to Freestone and she did so on the same day she questioned Butt. Tr. at p. 95. 
As an inmate in the San Juan County Jail, Butt was clearly not free to leave. Swink 
at Tfl 1. However, Freestone and Johnson's investigation of Butt placed further limitations 
on him than normal. Id. Johnson was acting as Freestone's investigator to further 
determine Butt's criminal conduct - conduct Freestone clearly found so concerning he 
tracked down the First Letter from further processing - and because of this increased 
limitation, any questioning should have been prefaced with the Miranda warning. 
Cadmus at 371-372. 
Miranda was intended to ensure suspects are not coerced into confessing as it was 
designed for situations believed to be intrinsically coercive and susceptible to abuse. Id. 
at 372. Interrogators should take extra precautions when questioning inmates for this 
very reason, recognizing their inability to "escape," and allowing interrogators such as 
Freestone to continue until the desired answers were obtained. Id. Butt resided in the San 
Juan County Jail from September 20, 2008, until January 30. 2009. Tr. at p. 105. He was 
questioned by Johnson in November of 2008. He was unable to be questioned and still 
feel "free to leave" Freestone or Johnson because he resided in the jail. See, Cadmus at 
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372. The situation calls for Miranda based on the propensity for abuse and coerciveness 
due to his incarceration status. Cadmus at 371-372. Giving of Miranda is simplistic and 
ensures that Butt would have recognized his ability to freely "walk away" from 
questioning. 
Johnson subjected Butt to express questioning by asking him the ages of his 
children, which is a direct element of the charges herein. Furthermore, this information 
was required to file the charges herein against Butt. Johnson's questions were accusatory 
because Freestone had reasonable grounds to believe crimes had been committed and 
reasonable grounds to believe Butt had committed them. Mirquet at 998. Therefore, a 
Miranda warning was required and, in its absence, Butt was compelled to be a witness 
against himself in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. V. and UT. CONST. ART. 1, §12. 
Because Butt was compelled to be a witness against himself it is clear that such 
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Butt's Fifth Amendment rights were 
implicated without the protections afforded him thereunder, as required under Miranda. 
He had a constitutional right to be informed that the information being obtained could be 
used against him in court. Thus, this Court should determine that Miranda warnings 
were required and that, because they were not given, the error that occurred was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Butt respectfully requests that this 
Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems necessary. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2010. 
William L. Schultz 
Attorney for Eric Leon Butt 
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